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Modeling and Measuring Scale Attraction Effects: 
An Application to Charitable Donations 
 
Abstract 
 
Charities seeking donations typically employ an “appeals scale,” a roster of suggested 
amounts presented to potential donors, along with an “Other” category. Yet little is known about 
how the amounts comprising appeals scales affect whether a donation is made and, if so, jointly 
exert “pull” on its magnitude. Availing of multi-year panel data and a field experiment, we 
develop a model accounting for individual level donation incidence, amount, and appeals scale 
attraction effects. The model incorporates heterogeneity across donors in both upward and 
downward scale point attraction, as well as in donation patterns (e.g., seasonality), and 
accommodates multiple operationalizations of internal and external referents to summarize the 
effects of prior donation history and scale points, respectively. 
Overall results suggest that scale points do exert substantial attraction effects; that these 
vary markedly across donors; that they are in fact referent-based effects; that donors are more 
easily persuaded to give less than more; and that, while all scale points exert pull, influence 
wanes with distance. The modeling framework applies not only in donation contexts, but 
whenever an ordered categorical scale is used to collect data regarding an underlying latent 
response.  
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Introduction  
Charities are, collectively, among the largest global financial entities. The National 
Center for Charitable Statistics lists over a million public charitable organizations in the United 
States alone, with $1.65 trillion in collective revenue, more than Wal-Mart, ExxonMobil, 
Berkshire Hathaway, and Apple combined, fully 5.3% of GDP.1 Solicitations for donations have 
become a part of everyday life, with requests being made at stores, workplaces, through the mail, 
various traditional media, and increasingly online (e.g., e-mail, websites, social networks). 
Private citizens have been generous to charities, with over 95% of US households donating per 
annum in one form or another. To help guide potential donors to both decide to give, and to give 
generously, charities commonly present them with an “appeals scale”; Figure 1 presents three 
such scales, used for recent funding drives by the United Way (the largest US charity, with over 
$3B in annual donations), Wikipedia, and the UN Foundation. Each features the most common 
sort of appeals scale: a series of specific donation amounts, along with “Other” (i.e., an option to 
donate whatever amount one wishes). Donors can thereby choose to give some amount not listed 
on the scale, including amounts outside the range of listed values, or not at all. 
Because donors can – and do, as detailed later empirically – avail of an Other amount of 
their own choosing, one might question why “rational” donors would comply, choosing one of 
the pre-established scale points instead of some other amount. Regardless, the mere presence of a 
scale might “pull” donors upwards or downwards (hopefully the former) from what they might 
have donated otherwise. Such questions are of practical concern for charities, who wish to 
enhance donation drive effectiveness, and so need to assess appeals scale effects accurately. 
Despite their ubiquity in charitable requests and fundraising, there is a lack of model-
                                                            
1 As per 2013, the most recent year for which comprehensive statistics are available, and adopted throughout for 
consistency (http://nccs.urban.org/statistics/quickfacts.cfm). 
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based guidance as to how appeals scales affect individual donor behavior. Part of the problem in 
providing such guidance is the need for household-level, longitudinal data on both charitable 
requests and outcomes – “whether” and “how much” – which charities typically possess, along 
with a (suitably heterogeneous) statistical model for scale attraction effects, which they typically 
do not. Here, we formulate and estimate such a model, one that incorporates heterogeneity in 
individual-level “scale attraction” effects, seasonal variation in giving, and an interrelated 
account for whether and how much to give, calibrated on the results of a field experiment and 
donation history panel data from a French charity.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first provide a concise overview 
of prior literature on scale attraction, donation behavior, reference effects, and related areas. We 
then describe our empirical application, develop the model, and present both empirical results 
and model comparisons, followed by general conclusions and potential for additional research. 
Literature Review  
The contextual effects of scale presentation on responses have been intensively examined 
in social psychology over the past two decades. Schwarz’s (1999) comprehensive review 
suggests that features of research instruments – question wording, format, and scaling, among 
others – can substantially affect respondents’ self-reported behaviors and attitudes, echoing 
earlier findings summarized by Podsakoff and Organ (1986). In particular, response scales often 
act as far more than a simple “measurement device,” serving as reference frames that influence 
responses (Schwarz et al. 1991).  
It has long been observed that manipulating information on prior donations from others 
can strongly affect donation behavior (Reingen 1982), as Shang et al. (2008) and Shang and 
Croson (2009, 2013) found in a variety of fundraising field tests. Several studies have addressed 
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the role of request size on donation behavior (amount and compliance) in laboratory and field 
data (Doob and McLaughlin 1989, Fraser et al. 1988, Schibrowsky and Peltier 1995, Weyant and 
Smith 1987). Although contexts and methods vary across them, these studies largely confirm 
scale manipulation effects, yet differ as to whether they affect donation likelihood, donation 
amount, or both. De Bruyn and Prokopec (2013), in reviewing this literature, emphasize both the 
lack of convergence in empirical studies of donation incidence and frequency (e.g., p. 500), and 
also the importance of individual-level summaries of prior donation behavior, noting that a 
“...few studies have acknowledged differences in internal reference points... but they have only 
done so on the segment level.” In marketing specifically, such reference effects are a cornerstone 
and have been supported empirically in dozens of studies (Kalyanaram and Winer 1995 and 
Mazumdar, Raj, and Sinha 2005 provide extensive reviews for reference pricing, specifically). 
We make especial use of one of the key findings from this literature: that two distinct 
kinds of referents – internal and external – play a role in choice decisions. In donation contexts, 
as discussed extensively by De Bruyn and Prokopec (2013), the former can be characterized by 
what the donor “intends” to give, the latter by what the donor is asked to. Specifically, the 
internal referent is an unobservable that must be inferred from other information (e.g., past 
donation behavior), while external referents are presented at the time of the request via the 
appeals scale. Both types of referent were extensively tested and verified by Mayhew and Winer 
(1992) in the context of frequently-purchased consumer goods, and modeled, using an 
asymmetric response function concordant with Prospect Theory, by Hardie, Johnson, and Fader 
(1993), whose formulation we discuss later. 
By contrast, perhaps owing to the lack of individual-specific histories, prior accounts of 
appeals scale manipulation have led to a range of non-consistent results. For example, Weyant 
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and Smith (1987) found no significant difference in the average donation amount between the 
“smaller request” and “larger request” conditions, only in donation rate. Yet Doob and 
McLaughlin (1989) suggested, that when the “larger request” is beyond what donors can accept 
(e.g., outside a latitude of acceptance; Kalyanaram and Little 1994), it exerts negligible effect: 
when lower amounts were substituted in the “larger request” condition, there was a significant 
difference in the average donation amount, but none in rate. Two points are relevant here: first, 
this one change in referent reversed the pattern of substantive results; and, second, researchers 
should consider, or model, the picture painted jointly by donation incidence and amount. 
Another potential source of inconsistencies involves parametric heterogeneity. Most 
previous studies could avail only of aggregate data (e.g., control / experimental group, or 
segment level; e.g., Desmet and Feinberg 2003) to assess the mean scale manipulation effect 
across conditions, potentially diluting the estimated effect of scale manipulation. In this regard, 
De Bruyn and Prokopec (2013) were exceptional in having obtained each donor’s prior donation 
before the field experiment, using it a proxy for the donor’s internal referent. Despite this 
advance, the one-shot, before/after nature of their data precludes incorporating both dynamics 
and “unobserved” parametric heterogeneity, which likewise plagues all prior studies relying on 
cross-sectional data. By contrast, a panel of individual donors provides a superior and dynamic 
platform to detect and measure scale effects. Panel data further enables us to build up an account 
of individual donors’ internal referents over time, as well as provide a fully heterogeneous 
account of scale attraction effects.  
Lastly, no published study employing scale manipulation has provided a unified account 
of both donation incidence and donation amount. Presuming whether to donate and how much to 
donate are unrelated can introduce well-known measurement errors (e.g., Wachtel and Otter 
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2013). An especially appealing framework is a Type II Tobit model, which comprises accounts 
of both incidence and a conditional output of interest (e.g., amount donated). Type II Tobit 
models have been deployed to analyze disparate contingent consumer decisions (e.g., Ying et al. 
2006 for recommendation provision and positivity, Ascarza and Hardie 2013 for usage and 
retention, Shi and Zhang 2014 for store visit and spending, etc.), with the connection between 
incidence and amount measured by a correlation parameter. Although not involving scale 
manipulation specifically, Donkers et al. (2006) and Van Diepen et al. (2009) used such a model 
in donation contexts, but with somewhat conflicting results regarding correlation; we return to 
this point later when discussing our own results. In the Conclusion, we discuss a number of 
behavioral theories that could in principle be assessed using the proposed model coupled with 
appropriate experimental data; given the nature of our field experiment, we do not engage in 
such testing here, but do indicate when our findings are consistent with prior frameworks. 
Data description  
Our data were provided by a French charity that conducted a large-scale field experiment 
as part of a national fundraising campaign. The charity holds three fund-raising drives a year, at 
Easter, June, and Christmas. Data were collected for 10 periods in total, and consist of 
household-level records for the appeals scale presented to donors, whether a donation was made 
and, if so, the donation amount. Donation appeals were made by door-to-door canvassing (and so 
results pertain to this relatively high involvement method) to “regular” donors, who had always 
been approached that way in the past; subjects were partitioned into two groups (“levels” 1 and 2) 
according to their average donation amounts over the two years prior to the start of the 
experiment. Household-averaged donations in the level 1 and 2 groups fall within 100 FF–199 
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FF and 200 FF–399 FF, respectively.2  
The charity sought to better understand the role of appeals scales in donation behavior, so 
manipulated it in an experiment using random assignment. Throughout, scales (see Table 1) all 
consisted of five suggested amounts, as well as an “Other” category, which allowed donors to 
give what they wished. The same scale (90, 150, 250, 500, 1000 FF) was used for all subjects for 
the first 8 periods of the data, and thereby helps establish a baseline. The scale was then altered 
for all subjects in period 9, then again for half in period 10, where different “test scales” were 
used in groups 1 (lower level) and 2 (higher). 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The charity thereby implemented a 2 × 2 design: (prior donation) “level 1” or “level 2” × 
random assignment to either a “standard” or “test” appeals scale in period 10.3 It is important to 
note that the charity was collecting real donations, and therefore did not have the luxury of 
‘optimally’ designing scales for experimental purposes, such as orthogonalizing (e.g., some 
donors asked for less than they were accustomed to), including extreme values, and the like. 
Thus, the points comprising the “test” scale for the level 2 (higher prior) donation group were, 
quite sensibly for a field test, higher than those for the level 1 group, and potentially constitute a 
source of endogeneity. We will explore this possibility in the sequel, by estimating the model 
separately on each group and comparing individual inferences via a multivariate Cramer test. 
Four hundred households in each of the four “cells” were randomly selected for analysis. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for each, average donation amount (per household and per 
occasion), and yield rate. Level 1 and 2 differ substantially in per-household and in per-occasion 
                                                            
2 The charity judges regularity based on donor frequency (number of donations in past two years) and recency 
(periods since last donation). The distinction was applied both prior to and throughout the data window. 
Currency is French Francs (FF), trading during the collection window at approximately 7 to the US dollar.  
3 The scale was changed twice (periods 9 and 10) for those in each of the test groups (Level 1 and Level 2), which 
helps identify both parametric heterogeneity and the effects of referents on the individual level. 
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average donation amounts (p < .0001); this is unsurprising, as the baseline donation amount was 
used by the charity to partition donors into different levels. However, yield rates are remarkably 
similar across the four groups, with all between 63% and 69% (differences all ns). Moreover, 
average observed donation fails to differ across the standard and test scales, within a donation 
level (1: 144.7 standard vs. 148.8 test, p > .2; or 2: 268.6 standard vs. 275.4 test, p > .5). One 
might conclude that there were no effects attributable to the use of the test scale. As the 
forthcoming analysis will show, such a conclusion based on aggregate metrics is not only 
premature, but highly misleading. 
[TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3 suggests a clear (aggregate) seasonal pattern in both yield rate and average 
donation amount: people give more, and more often, at Easter than during June or Christmas. 
The difference in yield rates is striking – nearly ¾ of respondents donate at Easter (an important 
holiday in France), while just under ¼ do at the other times of year – and these proportions are 
nearly identical in the level 1 and 2 donation groups (the latter, by construction, has higher 
donation amounts across the board). Holding aside any aggregate patterns, there is nonetheless 
sizable variation in household-level donation profiles, with many households showing a strong 
preference for giving at particular times of year; this will manifest in the forthcoming model as 
substantial heterogeneity in seasonality.  
“Model-Free” Evidence of Appeals Scale Effects 
Before building a model, one should ascertain whether there is a phenomenon worth 
modeling. Table 4 presents “model-free” evidence that quantities manifest unusually strongly 
when they appear on the scale, vs. when they do not; specifically, all points appearing on either 
the Standard or Test Scales, for Levels 1 and 2, separately, for the experimental period (10).  
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[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
For Level 1, the clearest evidence for scale attraction effects can be seen when the 
‘unusual’ amount of 120FF is substituted for 100FF: whereas only 0.2% of respondents donated 
120FF when it did not appear on the (Standard) scale, 18.4% did when it was among the five 
suggested amounts (p < 0.001 by Fisher’s exact test); a similar difference (0% vs. 6.9%; p < 
0.001) is apparent for the 180FF quantity. Both of these are sensible test values, given the 
~140FF average donation for the Level 1 group (see Table 2). For Level 2 donors, where the 
average is ~270FF, we might expect similar effects for larger values slotted into the Test scale. 
And this is precisely what we find: at 200FF (2.6% Standard vs. 18.8% Test; p < 0.001) and 
350FF (1.2% Standard vs. 10.6% Test; p < 0.001). Something analogous happens when a value 
is removed from the Standard scale, for example 150FF in either Level 1 (17.8% Standard vs. 5.4% 
Test; p < 0.001) or Level 2 (7.2% Standard vs. 1.8% Test; p < 0.001). 4 By contrast for all values 
included on both scales, as well as choosing not to give – that is, “None”, 250FF, 500FF in Level 
1, and “None”, 500FF in Level 2 – pairwise differences are all ns (p > .5 in all five cases). 
Thus, it seems fair to conclude that the appeals scale points succeed in “relocating” mass 
in the PDF for donation amounts. But this fails to answer several critical questions: Are all 
donors equally susceptible to scale effects?; Do all points ‘pull’ equally well?; Is the pull 
stronger upwards or downwards?; What is the role of prior donation history?; Are these truly 
reference effects?; among others. To answer these basic questions requires that one go beyond 
summary “model free” metrics and fashion a model calibrated on the individual histories of 
many households. Although we are not the first to examine appeals scales in individual 
donations (e.g., De Bruyn and Prokopec 2013), the model is indeed the first, to our knowledge, 
                                                            
4 This holds whenever the amount given was over 0.5%. That is, the proportions of 350 & 1000 (Level 1) and 750 & 
1000 (Level 2) are not significantly different, but this is due to the very small numbers of “large” donations.  
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that attempts to quantify appeals scale attraction effects. The presentation will therefore be 
suitably general, although the discussion will largely be tailored to our specific context of 
charitable donations. 
Model Development  
Internal and External Referents 
The model hinges on two constructs, as discussed previously and at length in the review 
of the literature by Mazumdar, Raj, and Sinha (2005): that, for a particular donor, each request 
can be associated with both an internal referent (ݎூ), which the analyst can relate to prior 
donation history, and external scale-point-based referents (ݎா); if an appeals scale contains 
multiple points, we denote the kth as ݎா,௞. 
A key modeling task is appropriately summarizing the effects of both the internal (IR) 
and external (ER) referents. Both admit different operationalizations, which can be empirically 
tested for a given model via standard fit metrics. Prior literature offers several options for IR, 
including most recent prior value (e.g., Krishnamurthi et al. 1992) and variously weighted 
amalgams of past realizations (e.g., the summary in Table 1 of Briesch et al. (1997). We test five 
such specifications, two specifically tailored to account for seasonal donation variations: the 
average of all prior observed donation amounts (IR-1); the last observed donation amount (IR-2); 
the average observed donation amount at the same time of year (IR-3); and the last observed 
donation amount at the same time of year (IR-4), and a geometrically-smoothed version (IR-5) 
that estimates the relative weight (α) on the last observed value (i.e., equation 3 of Mazumdar et 
al. 2005). Note that IR-2 is a special case of IR-5, with α = 1. These should be viewed not as 
mental constructs, which is in any case unverifiable, but as univariate autoregressive summary 
measures of past donation history, among which we will select the empirically best-fitting. 
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That the external reference (ER) points are observable might make them appear simple, 
or simpler, to account for. This might be so were there only a single requested amount. But, in 
practice, there are several, and so it is unclear how they exert their “joint pull”: perhaps the 
extremes are differentially noticed, or discounted; or only those nearest the internal referent have 
any influence; or some summary measure of all points (like the average or median); or 
something else entirely.5 De Bruyn and Prokopec (2013) speak directly to such weighting 
schemes, finding “leftmost anchor” exerted the strongest pull; this echoed a prediction of 
Schibrowsky and Peltier (1995), but is contrary to, for example, extremeness aversion (Simonson 
and Tversky 1992). We therefore consider a wide range of possibilities in the absence of prior 
theory to suggest how a group of referents exert collective influence, an intriguing open issue 
that our data and model may help address. Specifically, we test whether influence is exerted by: 
all scale points (ER-1); the two points closest the internal referent (ER-2); the largest and the 
smallest points (ER-3); the median (i.e., middle) point (ER-4); the mean of all points (ER-5); and 
all scale points with various weighting schemes, equally (e.g., with relative weights 1-1-1-1-1; 
ER-6); in a V-shape (3-2-1-2-3; ER-7); inverse-V (1-2-3-2-1; ER-8); increasing (1-2-3-4-5; ER-
9); and decreasing (5-4-3-2-1; ER-10).  
Modeling Scale Attraction Effects  
If the appeals scale “pulls” donors’ internal referents towards the presented external ones, 
these separate pulls can cumulate in their effects. A simple metric for scale point influence is its 
“compliance degree,” which we describe next. 
                                                            
5 Ideally, one would be able to estimate “weights” on each of the scale points, and do so heterogeneously across 
donors. Given donation histories and incidence rates in real charitable data, however, one must choose battles 
carefully in terms of where to place heterogeneity. Detailed simulations suggest that recovering more than four 
heterogeneous parameters for our data is precarious (in line with the findings of Andrews, Ainslie, and Currim 
2008), and we reserve these for the crucial constructs of scale attraction and seasonality. 
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1. Compliance Degree  
We define ܥܦ௞, “compliance degree” of the kth external reference point as the 
proportional increase (or decrease) from a donor’s internal reference point (ݎூ) to an external 
one (ݎா,௞). Specifically (with DA = Donation Amount received): 
 ܥܦ௞ ൌ ሺܦܣ െ ݎூሻ/ሺݎா,௞ െ ݎூሻ	 (1) 
For example, if a donor has (latent) internal referent $100, but is asked for $300 and partly 
complies by giving $150, ܥܦ௞ୀଵ = ($150 - $100) / ($300 - $100) = 25%. That is, the donor 
“came up 25%” from a $100 baseline. It is convenient to define the distance, ݀௞, between the kth 
external and the internal referent as a (positive) ratio:  
 	݀௞ ൌ ‖ݎா,௞ െ ݎூ‖/ݎூ	 (2) 
This allows both compliance degree and pulling amount (described later) to be expressed as 
dimensionless quantities, which in turn helps to unify the model; for example, comparing a donor 
planning to give $10, but gave $20, to one planning to donate $100, but asked for $200. 
We model both upward and downward “compliance degree curves”, which satisfy three 
properties: (1) ܥܦ௞ ൎ 1 for ݀௞ ൎ 0: “Maximal compliance occurs near donors’ internal 
referents”; (2) ܥܦ௞	decreases monotonically in ݀௞: “Compliance is worse for requests further 
from the internal referent”; and (3) ܥܦ௞ ൒	0: “Compliance can’t be worse than zero.” Properties 
1 and 2 suggest donation is highly responsive to asking for amounts close to what was ‘planned’ 
(the internal referent), but increasingly less so for distant amounts. Property 3 simply suggests 
that requests can be ignored, but do not literally repel donors from a scale point.  
Among the many ways to specify compliance degree curves satisfying these three 
properties, we select a translated gamma kernel function, for two reasons. First, it provides a 
parsimonious, yet flexible, functional form; this is important for a heterogeneous account to be 
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identified, given the small number of responses per donor during the data window. Second, the 
gamma kernel enables the pulling amount curves (described later) to follow a non-multimodal, 
yet flexibly-shaped, distribution. Specifically: 
 	ܥܦ௞ 	ൌ 	 ݁ݔ݌ሺെ݀௞/ߠሻ	; 	ߠ ൌ ቊ	expሺߚ
௎ሻ , ݎா,௞ ൒ ݎூ
expሺߚ஽ሻ , ݎா,௞ ൏ ݎூ (3) 
where ߠ ൐ 0 is the gamma kernel scale parameter; shape parameter is set at 1.6 When ݎா,௞ ൒ ݎூ, 
we have an “upward” compliance degree curve, and otherwise a “downward” one. Since the 
scale parameter (ߠ) must be positive, we specify ߚ௎	or	ߚ஽ ൌ ݈݊ሺߠሻ, where ߚ௎and ߚ஽are the 
“upward” and “downward” parameters in (3). Note that ߚ௎	= ߚ஽ does not imply identical 
upward and downward curves, because the domain of the downward curve is bounded by 100%, 
since one cannot give less than zero (i.e., a 100% decrement).  
Although our model is novel in its account of scale attraction effects, specifically, it is 
hardly the first to accommodate asymmetric (i.e., upward and downward) reference effects in an 
empirical context. Hardie, Johnson, and Fader (1993) built a model that explicitly encoded the 
possibility of different weighting of both price and quality deviations (from one’s last purchase) 
in utility, estimating the model on packaged goods. Our formulation, while similar in some 
respects, further accounts for the role of multiple external referents (the appeals scale), a variety 
of internal referent specifications, nonlinearity in utility, latent correlation in incidence and 
amount, and a more flexible (hierarchical Bayesian) account of “unobserved” heterogeneity. 
  
                                                            
6 Fixing the shape parameter at 1 yields a non-negative, monotonically decreasing, convex curve (with regard to the 
origin), satisfying properties 1-3. Numerous simulations showed recovery of two parameters (both scale and 
shape) was very poor, suggesting weak identification in data generated to resemble ours. Note that there are 
three sources of heterogeneity identification: (1) standard (MVN) distributional assumptions about the 
heterogeneity distribution; (2) between- group and within-donor scale variations; and (3) the nature of the 
internal and external referents, which each take multiple forms. 
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2. Pulling Amount  
The pulling amount	ሺܲܣ௞ሻ	is the size of effect exerted by a scale point, the product of 
compliance degree and distance between the internal (ݎூ) and the kth external referent (ݎா,௞): 
 	ܲܣ௞ 	ൌ 	ܥܦ௞ ൈ ||ݎா,௞ െ ݎூ|| (4) 
Pulling amount captures a trade-off between asking for too little and too much: If a charity asks 
for just a bit more than the internal referent, compliance (ܥܦ௞) may be high, but the potential 
surplus (||ݎா,௞ െ ݎூ||) is small. Conversely, asking for too much leads to low compliance and 
large surplus. This trade-off (where the extremes are literally zero) guards against ‘highly 
influential’ scale points being placed too close or too far from internal referents.  
Equation (4) implies that both “upward” and “downward” pulling curves also follow a 
gamma kernel, with shape parameter 2 and scale parameters exp	ሺߚ௎ሻ and exp	ሺߚ஽ሻ. As depicted 
in Figure 2, these curves can take a variety of shapes: the upward pulling curve has domain 
ሾ0,∞ሻ, is unimodal (and thus has a unique maximum), with zero at the origin and asymptoting to 
zero for large d (for any ߚ௎ሻ. The domain of the downward pulling amount curve is [0,1]; it is 
unimodal (with unique maximum) if ߚ஽ ൏ 0, and is monotonically increasing otherwise (with 
maximum at 1). These internal maxima map bijectively to {ߚ௎, ߚ஽}, and so provide an 
equivalent projection of the parameters onto a meaningful metric: which upward and downward 
scale amounts (proportions above the internal referent) provide the strongest expected deviations. 
Appendix C derives closed-form expressions for these, which we will use for graphical purposes.  
[FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
3. Accumulating Scale Attraction Effects  
Because real appeals scales invariably comprise multiple points, their effects need to be 
somehow combined. Figure 3 illustrates the “accumulated pulling amount” accruing from 
multiple scale points; to match our empirical application, five external referents – three greater, 
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two lesser – are depicted, with upward and downward curves on either side of the graph. 
Because the charity did not change scales many times across the 10 periods (nor within 
each of the four donation groups), identifying interactions among scale points is not possible. 
Thus, the effect of each scale point is modeled separately. This is partly mitigated by the 
weighted-averaging schemes explored for the “accumulated pulling amount”, or APA. In general: 
 	ܣܲܣ	 ൌ ∑ ݓ௞௄௞ୀଵ ൈ ܫ௞ 	ൈ ܲܣ௞;	ܫ௞ ൌ ቊ 1, ݂݅	ݎ
ா,௞ ൒ ݎூ
െ1, ݂݅	ݎா,௞ ൏ ݎூ	 (5) 
Summing the scale pulls (i.e., ݓ௞ ൌ 1) is simple and intuitive, but has a shortcoming in the 
effect of including additional scale points (not testable here, as the charity fixed this at 5). For 
example, given internal referent 50, the APA of the four-point scale {9, 11, 99, 101} would be 
about twice as strong for the two-point scale {10, 100}, which seems unrealistic. Averaging 
(ݓ௞ ൌ 1/k) addresses this, but raises other problems. For example, if a donor is asked for $2000 
when the planned amount is $100, the real effect of such a “distant ask” might be negligible. 
However, equal weighting suggests a sizable effect, which again seems unrealistic. A simple 
rescaling, i.e., 	ݓ௞ ൌ ௉஺ೖ∑ ௉஺ೖೖ಼సభ  , addresses both issues, while retaining proportionality. As 
mentioned previously, data limitations (indeed, for any data likely to be available in a charity-
based study) precluded measuring ݓ௞, leading to empirically testing the 10 weighting schemes 
of ER-1 through ER-10.  
General Model (Type II Tobit) 
We outline the general model structure, which affords a “dimensionless” account of pulling 
effects, so that heterogeneity can be specified across the log-scale for donation amount. As 
discussed, a Type II Tobit jointly accounts for donation incidence (“selection”) and amount: 
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 	ݕ௦∗ ൌ ܺ௦ߚ௦ ൅ ߳௦  (6) 
	 	ݕ௔∗ ൌ ݈݊ሺݎூ ൅ ܣܲܣሻ ൅ ܺ௔ߚ௔ ൅ ߳௔,	where:	
	 	ݕ௦ ൌ 1, if	ݕ௦∗ ൒ 0; 	0	otherwise	
	 	ݕ௔ ൌ ݕ௔∗, if	ݕ௦ ൌ 1; 	unobserved	otherwise		
	 	ሺ߳௦, ߳௔ሻ~	ܤܸܰሺ0, ߑఢሻ	; 	ߑఢ ൌ ൤ 1 ߩߪߩߪ ߪଶ൨  
The subscripts i and t (for donor and time) are suppressed, and ܺ௦ and ܺ௔ are covariates in the 
selection (s) and amount (a) equations, respectively, which we detail below.  
In the amount equation, ݕ௔∗ denotes the log of the latent donation amount, which is 
observed only when a donation is made, that is, when ݕ௦ = 1, which occurs when the latent 
variable ݕ௦∗ ൒ 0. The errors (߳௦, ߳௔) are bivariate normal, with variance of ߳௦ fixed to 1 for 
identification. It is important to note that we model the logarithm of donation amount, for several 
reasons: first, it allows ߳௔ to be plausibly homoscedastic; second, it allows all effects in the 
amount equation to enter multiplicatively; and third, it allows for coefficient heterogeneity to act 
on a dimensionless quantity, which we address in detail shortly.  
The amount equation (for ݕ௔∗) contains two deterministic components. The first is the 
sum of a donor’s internal referent (ݎூ) and the accumulated pulling amount (APA), which can be 
positive or negative. The second is all factors (ܺ௔ߚ௔) that affect the donation, other than those 
stemming from the appeals scale. Scale-based effects do not appear directly in the selection 
equation, because in our data all scales used were set in “reasonable” ranges for every donor 
(recall that these were real donors, and the charity was reluctant to alienate them with 
unrealistically high requests, or lose funds with low ones). The appeals scale exercises influence 
on donation incidence via the correlation, ߩ. [A model was estimated allowing for scale effects in 
selection; the APA coefficient in selection was ns.] 
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Explanatory variables and Heterogeneity 
1. Explanatory variables 
Selection equation 
The selection equation contains three types of explanatory variable (ܺ௦), which we detail 
subsequently: seasonal indicators, (log of) prior donation, and “level” fixed effects. Table 3 
reveals strong aggregate seasonal variation in donation likelihood, by far highest at Easter. Three 
dummies – Easter ( ௜ܺ௧ா), June ( ௜ܺ௧
௃ ), Christmas ( ௜ܺ௧஼) – represent when the request occurred. The 
log of (1+ amount the donor gave on the last request), donated ௜ܺ௧
௟௔௚, is included to examine 
carryover effects, and is 0 when no donation takes place.7  
Although Table 3 suggests only modest differences in yield rate between the “larger” 
(level 2) and “smaller” (level 1) donation groups, we include a Level dummy ( ௜ܺ௟௘௩௘௟) among the 
selection covariates, to allow for potential differences in baseline donation likelihood after 
accounting for seasonal patterns. Coefficients for the three seasonal dummies, the log-donation 
lag, and the level dummy, are denoted ߚா, ߚ௜௃, ߚ௜஼, ߚ௟௔௚, and ߚ௟௘௩௘௟,௦, respectively. In the 
experiment, donors were randomly assigned to receive either a Standard or a Test appeals scale 
(during period 10), so no dummies were entered for this difference (in either selection, or 
amount). Doing so failed to improve fit, in any case, so we do not discuss these again. 
Amount Equation  
Based on examination of the data and unimproved fit of models including them, seasonal 
dummies are not included in the amount equation; the somewhat higher amounts indicated at 
Easter in Table 3, for example, will be well-explained by other covariates, like lags in setting 
“internal” referents (such as in IR-3 and IR-4). The data suggested great household variation in 
                                                            
7 Replacing the log-donation lag with an indicator for whether one donated in the previous period led to poorer in-
sample fit, possibly reflecting that the continuous variable (log-donation) carries additional information. 
18 
 
when to give, not how much; and that household-level seasonal variation in amount (not 
incidence) is small for most donors. Lastly, although donation amount is mainly predicted by a 
donor’s internal referent and scale effects, a level dummy ( ௜ܺ௟௘௩௘௟) is included to account for the 
difference in baseline donation amount between the two groups, denoted ߚ௟௘௩௘௟,௔ . 
Heterogeneity  
It is critical to incorporate “unobserved” heterogeneity, which we do in several ways. 
First, we model heterogeneity in the seasonal dummies for the June and Christmas coefficients 
(ߚ௜௃ and ߚ௜஼).8 Importantly, since the model intends to capture scale attraction effects, the two 
“pulling” parameters (ߚ௜௎and ߚ௜஽) in the amount equation are heterogeneous. If for example ߚ௜௎ 
were homogeneous, each donor is presumed equally ‘elastic’ in being cajoled upwards. Our 
results will in fact strongly weigh against this presumption. To test implications across models at 
the individual level, we will use a multivariate generalization of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, 
the Cramér-von Mises statistic, on the individual-level joint posteriors for ሼߚ௜௎, ߚ௜஽ሽ. 
Our formulation therefore specifies four heterogeneous parameters, to be recovered from 
the relatively short data window of 7 occasions, roughly 3 of which resulted in donations, on 
average. Although this may appear ambitious, simulations showed good recovery for all four 
heterogeneous parameters, and excellent recovery of the others.  
Estimation 
The full model (see appendix A) is estimated using Markov chain Monte Carlo methods. 
Data augmentation (Tanner and Wong 1987) essentially converts the model to a Bayesian 
Hierarchical Seemingly Unrelated Regression. We obtain posterior draws via Metropolis-within-
                                                            
8 Extensive simulations for data generated using the proposed model failed to recover the true parameters (mean and 
covariance matrix) for ሼߚ௜ா, ߚ௜௃, ߚ௜஼ሽ heterogeneous. Restricting the most common donation period (Easter, with a 
>70% yield rate) to be homogeneous led to nearly perfect parameter recovery. In short, almost all households 
give at Easter at least occasionally, but there is large variation in giving patterns for Easter and June. 
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Gibbs algorithms: Gibbs sampling if the full conditional of a parameter block is of known form, 
and Metropolis-Hastings, with a random walk proposal (Chib and Greenberg 1995), otherwise. 
We set diffuse priors for all parameters of interest; detailed procedures appear in Appendix B. 
All estimates are based on 100,000 draws. We discard the first 50,000 draws for burn-in, and use 
the last 50,000 (thinned to every tenth) to calculate posterior densities. Trace plots and standard 
diagnostics indicated convergence of all key parameters. 
Results  
Model selection was based on LPML (log pseudo-marginal likelihood) which, as noted 
by Chen et al. (2008) works particularly well for GLM-type models, and more generally by Chen 
and Kim (2008). For brevity, we only present full estimation results for the model with IR-1 
(average of all observed donation amounts) and ER-1 (all scale points), as these provided the 
best fit compared with all possible combinations of the other internal and external references 
point formulations (i.e., IR 2-5 and ER 2-10). Table 5 summarizes posterior means and standard 
errors for all parameters. Detailed model comparison statistics appear in Table 6.  
[TABLES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Error Correlation in Selection and Amount equations 
The mean of the marginal posterior for the error correlation, ρ = -0.454, between 
selection and amount is negative, and the 95% highest density region (-0.516, -0.385) is far from 
zero. This suggests that unmeasured factors influencing selection are correlated with those 
influencing amount, and operate in opposite directions. For example, a donor might, for some 
“latent” reason, be saving up to give a larger donation, lowering frequency and raising amount; 
or, conversely, may compensate for not having given for a while with a larger donation. The size 
of the correlation is moderate: neither close to 0 nor to 1. This differs from findings in previous 
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research using related model formulations; for example, Donkers et al. (2006) found the 
correlation to be very slightly negative (-0.033; p < .001), while Van Diepen et al. (2009) found 
it to be large and positive, with  a 99% credible interval of (0.946, 0.970). Very small 
correlations may fail to correct for potential selection biases, or could reflect substantial, 
independent sources of error in each equation. Conversely, a large correlation might suggest 
nontrivial variables omitted in both equations. It is difficult to generalize such results, since our 
model accounts for scale attraction effects, while prior ones do not. We did, however, find 
significant, moderate, negative values of ρ across a very wide range of candidate models, 
indicating that error correlation needs to be accounted for in our data.  
We note in closing that ρ is a residual correlation, and is distinct from any “model-free”, 
observable correlation that might exist in the data, like between number and amount of donations 
made. This latter sort of correlation is computed across donors, but ρ could be assessed even for 
a single donor, if his/her donation history were long enough. Lastly, ρ is theoretically and 
empirically distinct from scale attraction effects per se: for example, although not having given 
in (say) the first two periods may make it more likely one will donate in the third (or donate 
more in the third), it should not make it more likely that one will move closer to a scale point. 
Selection: Seasonality 
Comparing the Easter coefficient (0.708) to the (heterogeneous) ones for June and 
Christmas (-0.505 and -0.993, respectively) accords with the observation that giving was much 
more likely for Easter, on average. There is a substantial seasonal heterogeneity: the SDs of 
individual-level parameters for June and Christmas are 0.390 and 0.777, respectively. The large 
(0.714) correlation between these individual-level parameters largely reflects the fact that June 
and Christmas yield rates are both low (Table 3) and a high proportion of donors gave at neither 
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time; nevertheless, the concordance of the model’s parameters with aggregate benchmarks is 
reassuring. 
Level Dummies and Lagged Log-Amount  
The level dummy is moderately significant (mean 0.108, SE 0.032) in selection, but 
strongly positive in amount (mean 0.260, SE 0.013). So, as aggregate statistics suggest, level 2 
donors give far more than those in level 1, but with modest difference in yield rates. The 
coefficient of the log-donation lag in selection is significantly negative (mean -0.123, SE 0.006), 
indicating that a larger donation amount last time leads to being less likely to give at all this time. 
“Pulling Effects”: Gamma Kernel Parameters in Donation Amount 
The values of ߚ௜௎	and	ߚ௜஽ determine each donor’s degree of compliance (“pull”) to the 
scale points above and below the internal referent. Because the domains of the two compliance 
curves differ, we should not compare ߚ௜௎ directly to ߚ௜஽. Figure 4A in some sense encapsulates 
our main results: the upward and downward pulling parameters (posterior means of ߚ௜௎	and	ߚ௜஽) 
for each donor. There is clearly a good deal of heterogeneity, indicating differing degrees of 
susceptibility to the appeals scale, despite only modest differences in prior donation behavior. 
That is, although these donors may seem similar in terms of observed donation behavior, they 
apparently are not in terms of how swayed they are by the appeals scale. 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
By allowing a bivariate density for (ߚ௜௎, ߚ௜஽), the model helps assess overall scale 
compliance. Specifically, we find a substantial correlation (0.446) in these values, suggesting 
that donors who are “upward compliant” tend to be “downward compliant” as well. There is no a 
priori reason to expect these should be correlated at all, let alone positively, and we believe this 
finding to be the first of its kind. As mentioned previously, the bivariate density for (ߚ௜௎, ߚ௜஽) 
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maps to the joint distribution of maximal pulling amounts (see Appendix C), those scale values 
associated with the strongest overall effects; we do not call these “optimal”, since a large 
downward pull is to be avoided. Heterogeneity in (ߚ௜௎, ߚ௜஽) leads to substantial variation in 
maximally effective scale values. The model suggests that the scale point with maximal upward 
pull, which varies across donors, ranges from 57.2% to 245.5%, with a mean of 94.9%, above 
one’s internal referent, which seems reasonable.9 This substantial variation has an important 
implication: that it may be possible to substantially increase donations by personalizing an 
appeals request, based on each donor’s history, although such dynamic optimization is nontrivial, 
and has similarly stringent data history requirements. 
Figure 4B translates the model’s key substantive findings into the context of the original 
data, specifically: How much does the maximally-effective “ask” value (either up or down) pull 
from the internal referent? It depicts, across donors, this maximal percentage increase and 
decrease (see appendix C for derivation), allowing a direct comparison of upward vs. downward 
scale attraction “strengths”; this was not sensible using the information on (ߚ௜௎, ߚ௜஽) in Figure. 4A, 
given their different domains of operation.  Maximum percentage increases range from 21.1% to 
90.3% (mean = 34.9%; SD = 5.4%); decreases from 31.2% to 94.5% (mean = 82.0%; SD = 
3.1%). These means suggest, unsurprisingly, that donations are more readily deflected downward 
than upward. Figure 10 suggests that the maximum percentage decrease is greater than the 
analogous increase for most donors: 81.6% of the donors lie above the diagonal (dotted) line.10 
This is nonetheless reminiscent of the asymmetric effects in Desmet and Feinberg (2006), whose 
lack of individual-level data precluded any distributions across donors, and De Bruyn and 
                                                            
9 Discussions with a large university’s fundraising team suggested that the success of such “upping” dropped nearly 
to zero when appeals hit 200% above a donor’s typical or last donation amount. 
10 This hypothesis about “up” vs. “down” differences can be tested. For our 1600 participants, “down > up” for 
1494/1600 = 93.4% based on 90% HDRs; and for 648/1600 = 40.5% based on 95% HDRs.   
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Prokopec (2013), who only had one-shot (i.e., “before” and “after”) data unsuited to modeling 
heterogeneity or carryover effects. 
Model comparisons  
The model and data together provide clear evidence of scale-based effects on the distribution of 
donations. But one might reasonably question whether these were strongly dependent on the 
particular form of the model, five of its elements in particular: 1) internal reference point 
specification; 2) external reference point specification; 3) including correlation (Type II Tobit), 
seasonality, and scale effects; 4) incorporating response heterogeneity; and, perhaps most 
important, (5) whether the scale should operate as reference effects at all, as opposed to merely 
summary covariates. We examine each of these in some detail, to assess relative “contribution” 
to overall model fit, comparing the five internal referent specifications (IR-1-5) and ten external 
reference formulations (ER-1-10), as described in the model development section.11 We refer to 
the model with all the aforementioned components – internal and external referents; error 
correlation; seasonality; heterogeneity – as the “full model”. Alternative models include those 
lacking: error correlation (“no correlation”), scale effects (“no scale effect”), both (“simple 
regression”), various forms of heterogeneity (i.e., homogenous seasonality, homogenous scale 
effects, and both), and reference effects altogether (“no reference effects”), as explained below.  
Owing to short donation histories (which preclude ‘squandering’ an entire year for 
prediction purposes), we compare fit in-sample, assessed via LPML, mean absolute deviation 
(MAD) and root mean square error (RMSE) for donation amount predictions; these appear in 
Table 6. The proposed model (“full” with IR-1, ER-1) provides a better fit than all alternatives 
via the LPML measure, and very nearly so using MAD and RMSE, surpassed  only by geometric 
                                                            
11 For IR-3, IR-4, if we don’t observe donation at a certain time of year in the initialization period (first full year, or 
three data points), we initialize using the mean of the all observed amounts in each group. 
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smoothing (with an optimal smoothing carryover near 0.4); moreover, including error correlation 
and scale effects improves fit regardless of internal reference formulation (IR1-5) and the 
inclusion of heterogeneity.12  
Table 6 also allows us to judge relative contribution to overall model fit: scale effects 
easily best both correlation and seasonality. For example, failing to account for scaling effects 
(“no scale effect”) inflates RMSE approximately 20% (i.e., to 0.335 from 0.279); the 
corresponding figure for removing correlation alone is ~2.5%. Dropping heterogeneity entirely 
entailed a ~6% RMSE decrease (to 0.297), but only ~0.7% of this was attributable to seasonality 
(RMSE = 0.281). These comparisons suggest that scale attraction effects may explain more 
variation in giving than those typically modeled in prior donation research combined, although 
only additional applications can verify whether this holds generally. 
In terms of internal reference point specification, IR-1, the average of all prior donation 
amounts appeared to dominate across the board, based on LPML. The degree of dominance was 
nontrivial, as high as 7.1% in RMSE; to our knowledge, such a test of ‘internal’ referents is 
unprecedented in donation contexts. Given this pattern of results, we restrict our attention to the 
“full” model with IR-1, and the lower portion of Table 7 summarizes fits of the ten external 
reference specifications (ER 1-10) for this model. ER-1, with all five scale points included, 
clearly dominates, by RMSE degrees ranging from 8% (vs. ER-4, for the median scale point) to 
66% (vs. ER-9), for linearly increasing emphasis on higher scale points. We hesitate to term this 
a general finding in the absence of data capable of assessing these weights (perhaps even 
                                                            
12 Estimates and fit statistics for all alternative models are available from the authors. Although RMSE and MAD are 
computed here across the entire posterior, model selection is based on the appropriate Bayesian criterion, 
LPML. If the former two are used instead, the geometric smoothing model, IR-5, is slightly superior for some 
values, including the “best” one of α ≈ 0.4. To check whether the IR-5 specification had different substantive 
implications, we recalculated the individual-level joint posteriors ሼβ୧୙, β୧ୈሽ and compared them to those from IR-
1 via Cramér-von Mises statistics, using the cramer package in R. At the .05 level of significance, none of the 
1600 participants showed significant differences; we therefore conclude, based on that and visual inspection of 
all model results, that IR-1 and IR-5 are substantively highly similar for these data. 
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heterogeneously) via estimation, but the degree of advantage for ER-1 over the other nine 
alternatives is at the very least suggestive, and differs from De Bruyn and Prokopec’s (2013) 
finding that the lowest scale point exerts the strongest influence (e.g., ER-10: RMSE = 0.377, or 
a 35% increase), although their empirical setting was somewhat different. 
Regardless, the “full” model with IR-1 and ER-1 was verified to provide the best fit to 
the data among the 2 × 2× 2 × 2 × 5 × 10 (scale effects?; scale effect heterogeneity?; seasonality 
heterogeneity?; error correlation?; IR1-5; ER1-10) design. However, this precludes the 
possibility that the scale effects were not reference effects, which we take up next.  
Division into Levels 1 and 2   
As reported earlier, the charity divided prior donors for the experiment in its customary 
manner, based on prior donation amounts. This is entirely sensible, given the potential for loss, 
and even the carefully randomized study of De Bruyn and Prokopec (2013) “...constructed a 
customized appeal scale for each donor, tailored to both his/her last donation and the assigned 
experimental condition”, introducing a potential for endogeneity. However, as Dorotic et al. 
(2014) report in the context of Loyalty Programs (LP), “From discussions with the LP manager, 
we know that only the frequency of the mailings is endogenous; its timing is not set based on 
individual behavior,” and so they can “easily correct for the endogeneity”.  In our study, timing 
of requests is fixed and identical across groups (Levels 1 and 2; Standard and Test), and only 
groupwise manipulations (i.e., for Levels 1 and 2 separately) are involved. It is possible to 
simply re-estimate the model for each Level alone: while this reduces statistical power, it ensures 
that the results for each individual are informed only by the scale used in that individual’s group 
(which cannot be ensured in the hierarchical Bayes set-up used to analyze the Level groups 
together). We focus on the main quantities of interest, individual-level estimates of the pulling 
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effects, (ߚ௜௎, ߚ௜஽), and test each of the 800 Level 1 and 800 Level 2 individual’s bivariate 
posterior from the “Levels estimated separately” model to those previously obtained: none of the 
1600 showed significant differences at the .05 level.  
Testing against Non-Referential Scale Effects 
The model-free evidence presented at the outset strongly suggests that respondents do 
react to the presence of the appeals scale, even though they have the option of ignoring it and 
donating whatever amount they want, or nothing at all. We assessed the importance of scaling 
effects in our model by estimating a nested version with the scaling removed entirely (Table 6, 
“no scaling effects”). But this raises the question of whether the hallmark of reference effects – 
(potentially asymmetric) pulling up and down, relative to a referent – is actually present in our 
data. The proposed model (6) is for the deviation between the donation amount and ݈݊ሺݎ௜௧ூ ൅
ܣܲܣ௜௧ሻ, the internal referent adjusted for (asymmetric) pulling effects. Another possibility is to 
retain summary measures of both IR and ER, but without reference effects, specifically. This 
entails removing ܣܲܣ௜௧ entirely, and instead including among the regressors (i.e., along with 
ߚ௟௘௩௘௟,௔ ௜ܺ௟௘௩௘௟) summary measures of the appeals scale points (i.e., ER-1-10), heterogeneously.13  
It is possible to compare these results (for all possible configurations of IR and ER) via 
LPML; in every case, the results are inferior to the proposed model (i.e., the “full” model, with 
IR-1 and ER-1). For the basis of explicit comparison, we replicated all the results of Table 6 for 
this revised model, and LPML ranges from -23419 (for IR-1, ER-2) to a best value of -22842 
(for IR-1, ER-3), compared to the proposed model’s best value -21968 (for IR-1, ER-1). {MAD, 
RMSE} were fairly stable for the “no reference effects” models, hovering near {0.298, 0.226} vs. 
{0.279, 0.210} for the proposed model. That this revised “scale effects, but no reference effects” 
                                                            
13 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this distinction, and suggesting this explicit model as a 
basis of comparison. 
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model makes use of the same data and identical operationalizations of both IR and ER, yet fits 
less well across the board – approximately 10% in log-donation, based on MAD – lends credence 
to the documents pulling effects being reference effects, specifically.  
Conclusion 
Charities have long relied on appeals scales as cornerstones of their donation requests, 
setting them based on experience and enlightened guesswork. By contrast, the model developed 
here offers a heterogeneous, joint account of donation incidence and amount, while accounting 
for the asymmetric effect of the appeals scale. Moreover, different specifications for internal and 
external reference point theories can be assessed via model comparison.  
Results suggest that variation across donors in scale attraction effects can be substantial. 
Such a finding depends critically on the availability of donation histories, explaining its absence 
from prior studies. A moderate, significantly negative, correlation between donation incidence 
and amount indicates the potential pitfalls of providing separately accounts, echoing similar 
results long-accepted in brand choice (e.g., Lattin and Bucklin 1991). In terms of internal and 
external referents, we found that the mean of the previous donation amounts (internal referents) 
and including all points in an appeals scale (external referents) offered the best fit with our data, 
compared with a wide variety of alternatives, as suggested by prior literature (e.g., Briesch et al. 
1997). The developed model can apply well beyond the domain of charitable requests, to any 
situation where different interval or ordered categorical scales are used. Indeed, it may be 
possible to leverage the model to not only detect, but correct for, many of the sorts of scaling 
artifacts widely documents by consumer researchers (e.g., Schwartz 1991, 1999). 
Field studies of this nature entail inevitable limitations. Charities are less concerned with 
optimal experimental practice than in gaining some degree of insight that doesn’t risk substantial 
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losses. In our study, for example, appeals scale amounts roughly tracked prior donation level in 
each segment, instead of being orthogonalized or randomized. Second, lack of substantial within-
donor appeals scale variation allowed us only to test various weighting schemes, as opposed to 
estimating the scale points’ relative influence, let along heterogeneously. Third, the optimal 
number of points can only be ascertained if these were systematically varied. And finally, 
because the appeals scales used by the study both historically and in the experiment contained 
only ‘reasonable’ amounts, effects of extreme scale points, such as ignoring them or even of 
alienating donors, await verification. Despite these data limitations, the model showed clear and 
strong evidence for scale attraction effects, in both upward and downward directions, and that the 
degree of attraction varied nontrivially across donors.  
We have knowingly avoided trying to engage in tight tests of specific behavior theories 
that, suitably interpreted, might make specific predictions about which scale points would be 
relatively influential. A prime example is Configural Weight Theory (e.g., Birnbaum et al. 1992), 
which suggests that a scale’s point’s influence depends on how it compares, typically ordinally, 
with other points and external anchors. Tests of such theories, including range theory (e.g., 
Janiszewski and Lichtenstein 1999), extremeness aversion (e.g., Simonson and Tversky 1992), 
etc., await tighter controls than are typically available in field data, as well as specific 
mathematical formulations amenable to statistical estimation on individual-level data, although 
some progress has been made on that front, e.g., for the compromise effect (Kivetz, Netzer, and 
Srinivasan 2004). 
Some of the data limitations suggest clear directions for future experimental and field 
research. First and foremost would be some scheme for orthogonalizing appeals scale amounts 
across various donor groups, as well as the number of points on the scale; this would allow 
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aspects of the scales themselves, like median and range, to be not merely measured in terms of 
influence, but optimized. Future research might also identify subtleties of weighting: do some 
respondents ignore endpoints, while others anchor on them? Experiments could similarly include 
extreme scale points, to see whether they are ignored entirely, lead respondents not to donate at 
all, or something more subtle. Lastly, the present data set could not address the persistence of 
scale attraction effects, specifically, the degree to which they may be self-correcting, which 
informs whether external anchors can effectively increase total contribution over a planning 
horizon, what fundraisers refer to as “laddering”; assessing such issues rigorously would likely 
require multiple independent scale manipulations in a field setting. Regardless, any such data 
could be analyzed through variants of the basic framework employed here, and would help 
validate cross-study norms about scale point attraction effects, as well as tentatively suggest 
individual-level directional or variational changes in appeals scale design. 
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Figure 2: Pulling Amount Curves  
 
Figure 3: Pulling amounts owing to multiple scale (external reference) points 
Note:  IR normalized to 100 on Y-axis 
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Figure 4A: Gamma “pulling” parameters (up and down) for each donor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4B: Maximum achievable pulling up and down proportions for each donor 
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Table 1: Appeals Scales used in the Field Experiment 
Appeals scale in periods 1-8 (all subjects) 
All Donors 90 FF 150 FF 250 FF 500 FF 1000 FF Other 
Appeals scale in period 9 (all subjects) 
All Donors 100 FF 150 FF 250 FF 500 FF 1000 FF Other 
Appeals scales in period 10, Standard and Test Scales 
Standard: 
Levels 1 and 2 100 FF 150 FF 250 FF 500 FF 1000 FF Other 
Test: Level 1 120 FF 180 FF 250 FF 350 FF 500 FF Other 
Test: Level 2 120 FF 200 FF 350 FF 500 FF 750 FF Other 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Period 10 (Experiment) Average Donation Amounts and Frequencies 
Prior donation level Scales Yield rate Average observed donations (FF) 
1 
Standard 63.3% 143.7 
Test 62.5% 148.7 
2 
Standard 65.3% 268.6 
Test 68.6% 275.5 
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Table 3: Yield Rate and Average Amount of Observed Donations across Seasons 
  
Level 1 Level 2 
Easter June Christmas Easter June Christmas 
Yield rate 71.9% 19.5% 21.7% 73.3% 20.1% 24.3% 
Average 
donation per 
occasion 
139.1 125.3 126.9 258.8 217.2 206.6 
 
 
 
Table 4: Proportion of Donations at Amounts* on Standard or Test Scales, Period 10 
 
Level 1 
Standard  
Level 1 
Test  
Level 2 
Standard  
Level 2 
Test 
Scale 
Point % 
Scale 
Point % p-value
Scale 
Point % 
Scale 
Point % p-value
 100* 18.6% 100 07.3% 0.000  100* 02.6% 100 01.6% 0.450 
120 00.2%  120* 18.4% 0.000 120 00.1%  120* 02.9% 0.000 
 150* 17.8% 150 05.4% 0.000  150* 07.2% 150 01.8% 0.000 
180 00.0%  180* 06.9% 0.000 200 02.6%  200* 18.8% 0.000 
 250* 05.1%  250* 04.4% 0.743  250* 026.7% 250 09.1% 0.000 
350 00.0%  350* 00.3% 1.000 350 01.2%  350* 10.6% 0.000 
 500* 00.3%  500* 00.3% 1.000   500* 05.3%  500* 04.4% 0.627 
 1000* 00.0% 1000 00.0% 1.000  750 00.0%  750* 00.3% 1.000 
None 49.4% None 50.2% 0.832  1000* 00.3% 1000 00.2% 1.000 
 Other 08.6% Other 06.8% 0.342 None 44.1% None 42.2% 0.618 
 Other 09.9% Other 08.1% 0.373 
 
* Starred amounts are those appearing on either scale (Standard or Test) within-Level. 
  p-values all stem from Fisher’s Exact test for equality of proportions. 
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Table 5: Parameter Estimates for Full Model 
Coefficient mean SE 95% HDR 
H
om
og
en
eo
us
 
correlation (ρ) -0.454 0.033 (-0.516, -0.385) 
sd of log amount (σ)  0.299 0.004 (0.291, 0.307) 
Easter dummy (βE) 0.708 0.026 (0.657, 0.757) 
level dummy in selection (βlevel,s) 0.108 0.032 (0.047, 0.166) 
log amount lag in selection (βlag) -0.123 0.006 (-0.136, -0.110) 
level dummy in amount (βlevel,a) 0.260 0.013 (0.235, 0.287) 
H
et
er
og
en
eo
us
 
pulling up (βiU) -0.063 0.039 (-0.146, 0.007) 
pulling down (βiD) 1.630 0.225 (1.245, 2.127) 
June dummy (βiJ) -0.505 0.041 (-0.583, -0.425) 
Christmas dummy (βiC) -0.993 0.049 (-1.090, -0.901) 
sd of pulling up  0.330 0.022 (0.291, 0.378) 
sd of pulling down 0.943 0.127 (0.726, 1.213) 
sd of June 0.390 0.048 (0.308, 0.497) 
sd of Christmas 0.777 0.060 (0.655, 0.895) 
corr(June & Christmas) 0.714 0.083 (0.540, 0.871) 
corr(pulling up & pulling down) 0.446 0.095 (0.243, 0.612) 
corr(June & pulling up) -0.002 0.035 (-0.070, 0.065) 
corr(June & pulling down) 0.002 0.035 (-0.066, 0.070) 
corr(Christmas & pulling up) 0.003 0.034 (-0.064, 0.070) 
corr(Christmas &  pulling down) 0.003 0.035 (-0.067, 0.070) 
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Table 6: Model Fit Statistics (LPML, RMSE, MAD) for Various {IR, ER} Specifications 
and Restrictions, Computed over Model Posteriors 
 
 
Internal Referent Specification (with ER-1) LPML RMSE MAD 
IR-1 (average of all prior donations) -21968 0.279 0.210 
IR-2 (last donation) -22482 0.299 0.221 
IR-3 (average of same-season donations) -22372 0.288 0.212 
IR-4 (last same-season donation) -22558 0.294 0.222 
IR-5: (geometrically smoothed, α = 0.4) -22125 0.277 0.207 
IR-1 Model with Restrictions:       
  No correlation (ρ = 0) -22063 0.286 0.215 
  No scale effect -23095 0.335 0.226 
  Simple regression -23110 0.335 0.224 
  Heterogeneous scale effect only -22307 0.281 0.211 
  Heterogeneous seasonality only  -22972 0.295 0.216 
  Homogeneous scale effect and seasonality -22716 0.297 0.218 
 
 
External Referent Specification (with IR-1) LPML RMSE MAD 
ER-1 (all scale points) -21968 0.279 0.210 
ER-2 (two points closest to IR) -22498 0.304 0.221 
ER-3 (largest and smallest points) -22567 0.326 0.222 
ER-4 (median scale point) -22339 0.301 0.223 
ER-5 (mean of all scale points) -22445 0.316 0.218 
ER-6 (equal weight: {1,1,1,1,1}) -22365 0.325 0.255 
ER-7 (V-shaped: {3,2,1,2,3}) -22704 0.321 0.252 
ER-8 (Inverse V: {1,2,3,2,1}) -22247 0.336 0.264 
ER-9 (Increasing: {1,2,3,4,5}) -22615 0.463 0.375 
ER-10 (Decreasing: {5,4,3,2,1}) -22313 0.377 0.294 
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Appendices A - C 
A. Full Model Specification 
As discussed above, we can write the entire model as follows (i = donor; t = time): 
	ݕ௜௧௦∗ ൌ ߚா ௜ܺ௧ா ൅ ߚ௜௃ ௜ܺ௧௃ ൅ ߚ௜஼ ௜ܺ௧஼ ൅ ߚ௟௔௚ ௜ܺ௧௟௔௚ ൅ ߚ௟௘௩௘௟,௦ ௜ܺ௟௘௩௘௟ ൅ ߳௜௧௦ 	 
	ݕ௜௧௔∗ ൌ ݈݊ሺݎ௜௧ூ ൅ ܣܲܣ௜௧ሻ ൅ ߚ௟௘௩௘௟,௔ ௜ܺ௟௘௩௘௟ ൅ ߳௜௧௔ , where: 
	ݕ௜௧௦ ൌ 1, if	ݕ௜௧௦∗ ൒ 0; 	0	otherwise	
	ݕ௜௧௔ ൌ ݕ௜௧௔∗ ൌ lnሺ݀݋݊ܽݐ݅݋݊	ܽ݉݋ݑ݊ݐሻ , if	ݕ௜௧௦ ൌ 1; 	unobserved	otherwise	
	ܣܲܣ௜௧ ൌ ෍ݓ௜௧௞
௄
௞ୀଵ
ൈ ܫ௜௧௞ ൈ ܲܣ௜௧௞ 	; 	ݓ௜௧௞ ൌ ܲܣ௜௧
௞
∑ ܲܣ௜௧௞௄௞ୀଵ , ܫ௜௧
௞ ൌ ቊ 1, ݂݅	ݎ௜௧
ா,௞ ൒ ݎ௜௧ூ
െ1, ݂݅	ݎ௜௧ா,௞ ൑ ݎ௜௧ூ 	
 
	ܲܣ௜௧௞ 	ൌ 	ܥܦ௜௧௞ ൈ ||ݎ௜௧ா,௞ െ ݎ௜௧ூ || 
	ܥܦ௜௧௞ 	ൌ ݁ݔ݌ ቆെ݀௜௧
௞
ߠ௜ ቇ	; 	ߠ௜ ൌ ቊ
exp	ሺߚ௜௎ሻ, ݎ௜௧ா,௞ ൒ ݎ௜௧ூ
exp	ሺߚ௜஽ሻ, ݎ௜௧ா,௞ ൑ ݎ௜௧ூ
, ݀௜௧௞ ൌ ||ݎ௜௧
ா,௞ െ ݎ௜௧ூ ||
ݎ௜௧ூ  
	ሺ߳௜௧௦ 	, ߳௜௧௔ ሻ	~	ܤܸܰሺ0, ߑఢሻ	; 	ߑఢ ൌ ൤ 1 ߩߪߩߪ ߪଶ൨ 
	ߚ௜~ܯܸܰ൫∆, ߑఉ൯,where	ߚ௜ ൌ ሺߚ௜௃, ߚ௜஼, ߚ௜௎, ߚ௜஽ሻ	 
Note that the internal reference point, ݎ௜௧ூ , for donor i can change over the course of the 
experiment, and is subscripted accordingly, as is the kth external reference point for a donor i at 
time t, ݎ௜௧ா,௞. Again, the variance of ߳௦ is fixed to 1 for identification. Finally, the vector of 
heterogeneous parameters (ߚ௜) follows a multivariate normal distribution with mean ߤఉ and full-
rank covariance matrix ߑఉ. 
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B. MCMC Algorithm and Priors 
Here we present the prior distributions and sampling algorithm used in estimation. Because the 
requirement that setting error variance of the binary probit model (for donation incidence) be set 
to one ruins useful conjugacy properties, we instead make random draws from the unidentified 
space, as suggested by Edwards and Allenby (2003), and report post-processed estimates. Below, 
we specify ߑఢ in the unidentified space as ߑఢ ൌ ൤ ߪ௦
ଶ ߩߪ௦ߪ௔
ߩߪ௦ߪ௔ ߪ௔ଶ ൨. 
1. Data Augmented Likelihood 
ෑෑሾሺ
୘
୲ୀଵ
୬
୧ୀଵ
ݕ௜௧௦∗, ݕ௜௧௔∗ሻ|ߚ௛, ߚ௜, ߑఢሿ ൈෑሾ	ߚ௜|
௡
௜ୀଵ
ߤఉ, ߑఉሿ 
where ߚ௛ ൌ ሺߚா, ߚ௟௔௚, ߚ௟௘௩௘௟,௦, ߚ௟௘௩௘௟,௔ሻ is a vector of homogeneous parameters and ߚ௜ ൌ
ሺߚ௜௃, ߚ௜஼, ߚ௜௎, ߚ௜஽ሻ	is a vector of heterogeneous parameters. 
2. Prior Distribution 
We use proper but diffuse priors. 
(1) ߚ௛~ܯܸܰሺܯ, ܸሻ,where	ܯ ൌ ૙, ܸ ൌ 10ସܫ 
(2) ߑఢ~ܫܹ൫ߥఀച, ఀܸച൯, where	ߥఀച ൌ 5, ఀܸച ൌ 5ܫ 
(3) ߂~ܯܸܰሺ߂,ഥ ܣሻ, where	∆തൌ ૙, ܣ ൌ 10ସܫ 
(4) ߑఉ~ܫܹሺߥఀഁ, ఀܸഁሻ, where	ߥఀച ൌ 7, ఀܸച ൌ 7ܫ 
3. Posterior Distribution 
ෑෑሾሺ
୘
୲ୀଵ
୬
୧ୀଵ
ݕ௜௧௦∗, ݕ௜௧௔∗ሻ|ߚ௛, ߚ௜, ߑఢሿ ൈෑሾ	ߚ௜|
௡
௜ୀଵ
ߤఉ, ߑఉሿ ൈ ሾߚ௛|M, Vሿ ൈ ൣߑఢหνఀച, Vఀച൧ ൈ ሾΔ|Δ,ഥ Aሿ
ൈ ሾߑఉ|ߥఀഁ, Vఀഁሿ 
4. Sampling Algorithm 
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Step 1. Draw ݕ௜௧௦∗ and ݕ௜௧௔∗ (Data augmentation step) 
ሾሺݕ௜௧௦∗, ݕ௜௧௔∗ሻ|ݕ௜௧௦ , ݕ௜௧௔ , ߚ௛, ߚ௜, ߑఢሿ 
1. If ݕ௜௧௦ ൌ 1 then ݕ௜௧௔  is observed. We set ݕ௜௧௔∗ ൌ ݕ௜௧௔  and draw ݕ௜௧௦∗ from the truncated normal 
distribution below: 
ܶܰ ቀߚா ௜ܺ௧ா ൅ ߚ௜௃ ௜ܺ௧௃ ൅ ߚ௜஼ ௜ܺ௧஼ ൅ ߚ௟௔௚ ௜ܺ௧௟௔௚ ൅ ߚ௟௘௩௘௟,௦ ௜ܺ௟௘௩௘௟ ൅ ఘఙೞఙೌ ൣݕ௜௧
௔ െ ሺ݈݊ሺݎ௜௧ூ ൅ ܣܲܣ௜௧ሻ ൅
ߚ௟௘௩௘௟,௔ ௜ܺ௟௘௩௘௟ሻ൧, ሺ1 െ ߩଶሻߪ௦ଶቁ , ݕ௜௧௦∗ ൒ 0  
2. If ݕ௜௧௦ ൌ 0 then ݕ௜௧௔  is not observed. We draw ሺݕ௜௧௦∗, ݕ௜௧௔∗ሻ by following steps 
a. Draw ݕ௜௧௦∗ from ܶܰ൫ߚா ௜ܺ௧ா ൅ ߚ௜௃ ௜ܺ௧௃ ൅ ߚ௜஼ ௜ܺ௧஼ ൅ ߚ௟௔௚ ௜ܺ௧௟௔௚ ൅ ߚ௟௘௩௘௟,௦ ௜ܺ௟௘௩௘௟, ߪ௦ଶ൯, ݕ௜௧௦∗ ൏ 0 
b. Draw ݕ௜௧௔∗ conditional on ݕ௜௧௦∗ from normal distribution below: 
ܰ ቀ݈݊ሺݎ௜௧ூ ൅ ܣܲܣ௜௧ሻ ൅ ߚ௟௘௩௘௟,௔ ௜ܺ௟௘௩௘௟ ൅ ఘఙೌఙೞ ൣݕ௜௧
௦∗ െ ሺߚா ௜ܺ௧ா ൅ ߚ௜௃ ௜ܺ௧௃ ൅ ߚ௜஼ ௜ܺ௧஼ ൅ ߚ௟௔௚ ௜ܺ௧௟௔௚ ൅
ߚ௟௘௩௘௟,௦ ௜ܺ௟௘௩௘௟ሻ൧, ሺ1 െ ߩଶሻߪ௔ଶቁ  
Step 2. Draw ߚ௜ 
ሾߚ௜|ߚ௛, ߑఢ, ߂, ߑఉሿ ∝ෑሾሺݕ௜௧௦∗, ݕ௜௧௔∗ሻ|ߚ௛, ߚ௜, ߑఢሿ
்
௧ୀଵ
ൈ ሾߚ௜|߂, ߑఉሿ 
The full conditional distribution is also of unknown form. Therefore, we use a Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm with a normal random walk proposal to make draws. 
Step 3. Draw ߚ௛ 
ሾߚ௛|ሼߚ௜ሽ, ߑఢሿ ∝ 	ෑෑሾሺ
்
௧ୀଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ
ݕ௜௧௦∗, ݕ௜௧௔∗ሻ|ߚ௛, ߚ௜, ߑఢሿ ൈ ሾߚ௛|ܯ, ܸሿ 
Again, we use a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with a normal random walk proposal to make 
draws. 
Step 4. Draw ߑఢ 
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ሾߑఢ|ߚ௛, ሼߚ௜ሽሿ ∝ ∏ ∏ ሾሺ௧்ୀଵ௡௜ୀଵ ݕ௜௧௦∗, ݕ௜௧௔∗ሻ|ߚ௛, ߚ௜, ߑఢሿ ൈ ൣߑఢหߥఀച, ఀܸച൧ ∝
∏ ∏ ܤܸܰሺ൬ݕ௜௧
௦∗
ݕ௜௧௔∗൰ |௧்ୀଵ
௡௜ୀଵ ቆߚ
ா ௜ܺ௧ா ൅ ߚ௜௃ ௜ܺ௧௃ ൅ ߚ௜஼ ௜ܺ௧஼ ൅ ߚ௟௔௚ ௜ܺ௧௟௔௚ ൅ ߚ௟௘௩௘௟,௦ ௜ܺ௟௘௩௘௟
݈݊൫ݎ௜௧ூ ൅ ܣܲܣ௜௧൯ ൅ ߚ௟௘௩௘௟,௔ ௜ܺ௟௘௩௘௟
ቇ , ߑఢሻ ൈ 	ܫܹሺߥఀച, ఀܸചሻ  
ሾߑఢ|ߚ௛, ሼߚ௜ሽሿ~	ܫܹሺߥ෤ఀച, ෨ܸఀചሻ 
where ߥ෤ఀച ൌ ߥఀച ൅ ݊ܶ, 
෨ܸఀച ൌ ఀܸച ൅෍෍ቆ
ݕ௜௧௦∗ െ ൫ߚா ௜ܺ௧ா ൅ ߚ௜௃ ௜ܺ௧௃ ൅ ߚ௜஼ ௜ܺ௧஼ ൅ ߚ௟௔௚ ௜ܺ௧௟௔௚ ൅ ߚ௟௘௩௘௟,௦ ௜ܺ௟௘௩௘௟൯
ݕ௜௧௔∗ െ ൫݈݊ሺݎ௜௧ூ ൅ ܣܲܣ௜௧ሻ ൅ ߚ௟௘௩௘௟,௔ ௜ܺ௟௘௩௘௟൯
ቇ
்
௧ୀଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ
ൈቆݕ௜௧
௦∗ െ ሺߚா ௜ܺ௧ா ൅ ߚ௜௃ ௜ܺ௧௃ ൅ ߚ௜஼ ௜ܺ௧஼ ൅ ߚ௟௔௚ ௜ܺ௧௟௔௚ ൅ ߚ௟௘௩௘௟,௦ ௜ܺ௟௘௩௘௟
ݕ௜௧௔∗ െ ሺ݈݊ሺݎ௜௧ூ ൅ ܣܲܣ௜௧ሻ ൅ ߚ௟௘௩௘௟,௔ ௜ܺ௟௘௩௘௟ሻ
ቇ
்
 
Step 5. Draw ∆ 
ൣ∆หሼߚ௜ሽ, ߑఉ൧ ∝ෑሾߚ௜|
௡
௜ୀଵ
∆, ߑఉሿ ൈ ሾ∆|̅߂, ܣሿ ∝ ܯܰ ௡ܸ௞ሺܤ∗|ሾܼ ⊗ ܫ௞ሿ∆∗, 	ܫ௡ ⊗ ߑఉሻ ൈ ܯܰ ௡ܸ௞ሺ∆∗|߂,ഥ ܣሻ 
where ߚ௜ is a vector of length k, 
ܤ ൌ
ۏ
ێێ
ۍߚଵ்ߚଶ்∶
ߚ௡் ے
ۑۑ
ې
, ܤ௡௞ൈଵ∗ ൌ ݒ݁ܿሺܤ்ሻ, ܼ ൌ
ۏ
ێێ
ۍߡଵ்ߡଶ்∶
ߡ௡்ے
ۑۑ
ې
, ∆∗ൌ ݒ݁ܿሺ∆்ሻ 
ൣ∆∗หሼߚ௜ሽ, ߑఉ൧~ܯܰ ௡ܸ௞ሺ∆∗|߂ሚ, ܣሚሻ 
where ߂ሚ ൌ ܣሚ൫ൣܼ ⊗ ߑఉିଵ൧ܤ௡௞ൈଵ∗ ൅ ܣିଵ̅߂൯, ܣሚ ൌ ሾሺ்ܼܼሻ⊗ ߑఉିଵ ൅ ܣିଵሿିଵ 
Step 6. Draw ߑఉ 
ሾߑఉ|ሼߚ௜ሽ, ߂ሿ 	∝ෑሾߚ௜|
௡
௜ୀଵ
∆, ߑఉሿ ൈ ሾߑఉ|ߥఀഁ, ఀܸഁሿ ∝ 	ܯܰ ௡ܸ௞ሺܤ|ܼ∆, ܫ௡,ߑఉሻ ൈ ܫܹሺߑఉ|ߥఀഁ, ఀܸഁሻ 
ሾߑఉ|ሼߚ௜ሽ, ߂ሿ~ܫܹሺߥ෤ఀഁ, ෨ܸఀഁሻ 
where ߥ෤ఀഁ ൌ ߥఀഁ ൅ ݊, ෨ܸఀഁ ൌ ఀܸഁ ൅ ሺܤ െ ܼ∆ሻ்ሺܤ െ ܼ∆ሻ 
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C. Maximum Achievable Proportions: Upward (% Increase) and Downward (% Decrease) 
1. Upward pulling amount. When ݎா ൒ ݎூ, the upward pulling amount ܲܣ௎ is given by: 
ܲܣ௎ ൌ exp ൬െ݀௎ߠ ൰ ሺݎ
ா െ ݎூሻ, ݀௎ ൌ ݎ
ா
ݎூ െ 1, ߠ௎ ൌ expሺߚ௎ሻ	 
The scale point with maximum upward pulling amount (ݎா∗) can be calculated by solving the 
first order condition for ܲܣ௎ with respect to ݎா.  
ݎா∗ ൌ ሺߠ௎ ൅ 1ሻݎூ ൌ ሺexpሺߚ௎ሻ ൅ 1ሻݎூ 
At the scale point ݎா∗, the incremental ratio in distance (݀௎∗ ሻ is determined to be exp	ሺߚ௎ሻ; and 
the maximum incremental ratio in amount as follows:  
exp ൬െ ݀௎
∗
expሺߚ௎ሻ൰ ሺݎ
ா∗ െ ݎூሻ/ݎூ ൌ exp	ሺߚ௎ െ 1ሻ 
2. Downward pulling amount. When 0 ൑ ݎா ൑ ݎூ, the downward pulling amount ܲܣ஽ follows: 
ܲܣ஽ ൌ exp ൬െ݀஽ߠ ൰ ሺݎ
ூ െ ݎாሻ, ݀஽ ൌ 1 െ ݎ
ா
ݎூ , ߠ஽ ൌ expሺߚ஽ሻ	 
The scale point with maximum downward pull (ݎா∗) can be obtained by solving the first order 
condition for ܲܣ஽ with respect to ݎா. [Note that there is a corner solution if ߚ஽ ൐ 0] 
ݎா∗ ൌ ൜ሺ1 െ ߠ஽ሻݎூ ൌ ሺ1 െ expሺߚ஽ሻሻݎூ, ߚ஽ ൑ 0	0, 																																																							ߚ஽ ൐ 0	 
At the scale point ݎா∗, the decremental ratio in distance (݀஽∗ ሻ is determined to be 
൜expሺβୈሻ , βୈ ൑ 01, 														βୈ ൐ 0		, 
And the maximum decremental ratio in amount is as follows: 
ۖە
۔
ۖۓexp ൬െ ݀஽
∗
expሺߚ஽ሻ൰ ሺݎ
ூ െ ݎா∗ሻ/ݎூ ൌ expሺെ1ሻ െ expሺβୈሻ , βୈ ൑ 0
exp ൬െ ݀஽
∗
expሺߚ஽ሻ൰ ሺݎ
ூ െ ݎா∗ሻ/ݎூ ൌ exp ൬െ 1expሺβୈሻ൰ , βୈ ൐ 0
 
